Marines in Marja and the Battles to Come

C.J. Chivers, writing in the New York Times, lays out what the current Marine battles in Marja tell us about what the short-term future holds:

Is the violence a predictable summer fight for an area the Taliban and those who profit from the drug economy do not want to lose; in other words, an unsurprising flare-up that can be turned around? Or will Marja remain bloody for a long time, allowing insurgents to inflict sustained losses on American units and win merely by keeping the fight alive?

According to Chivers and the Marines on the ground, it's too soon to tell.

Meanwhile, Marines are wounded by bombs or shot each week. The violence in itself does not mean that the campaign is lost. Fighting is normal to war, a concept sometimes played down in discussions about the United States’ counterinsurgency doctrine, which emphasizes developing relationships with the population and helping government agencies gain credibility and provide services.

Those directly involved caution that a few months of fighting is not necessarily a basis for grim forecasts, especially during the first summer in a former Taliban enclave. American commanders have been voicing frustration nonetheless, as was evident last month in Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s description of Marja as “a bleeding ulcer.”

The remark underscores perhaps the clearest conclusion that can be drawn thus far. Even before the last troops of the Obama administration’s surge arrive in Afghanistan, high-level American commanders appear pressed for time, no matter the complexities faced by troops on the ground.

Chivers points out that Marine tactics have changed in the past year, and the new approach means more direct contact with combatants, compared to earlier reliance on airstrikes and artillery. Less collateral damage to civilians means more wounded and dead Marines.

The pace of Marine patrols has also increased as they seek to perform the most basic of combat techniques - seek and maintain contact with the enemy.

As Chivers notes, everyone feels the pressure of time on combat operations. It's unlikely that the Obama administration will commit more troops or delay the planned 2011 pullout from Afghanistan unless there is empirical evidence of progress.

General McChrystal On Shooting Innocent People in Afghanistan

Via Talking Points Memo:

We've shot an amazing number of people and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat to the force.

Lucky Marine Steps on IED That Fizzles

I feel lucky if I find a penny on the sidewalk, or a good parking spot at the mall.

For Marine Lance Corporal Ryan Mathison, true luck is stepping on a pressure-plate rigged explosive that pops but fails to explode, saving his life and possibly the lives of several comrades in the area.

C.J. Chivers details the moment in time in his column, Foot on Bomb, Marine Defies a Taliban Trap in the New York Times. If you don't have Chivers in your news reader, now's the time to fix that.

As the Taliban increases the quantity and sophistication of their IEDs in response to the buildup of US troops in Afghanistan, our soldiers exposure rises exponentially, and happy endings are seldom found at the end of bomb stories. Except for this time. In this place. For this Marine.

Mathison won't need to get a haircut for the next several months, as his buddies will certainly rub his head for luck so often that new growth will be kept to a minimum. Grunts can be a superstitious lot.

Here's to Cpl. Mathison. Raise a glass to him the next time you are able.

Image via Wikimedia Commons

Who Are We To Preach Anti-Corruption?

The Huffington Post reports on former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's calling the United States "hypocritical" for demanding Afghan President Hamid Karzai purge his government of corruption:

“Who are we to seriously be preaching [such] a crusade?” he asked. “We have a financial sector that is voraciously greedy and exploitative, to put it mildly. We have a Congress which is not immune to special interests. And we have an electoral system that is based largely on private donations which precipitate expectations of rewards. The notion of us going to the Afghans and preaching purity is comical… I think we should just quit that stuff.”

Now if he could only get Mika to demonstrate some of that wisdom on Morning Joe.

Image via Wikimedia Commons
 

Victory Itch in Afghanistan

Vagabond Scholar links to Fafblog's post Victory Science as one view of the conundrum that is Afghanistan:

Let us never forget just what's at stake in the war in Afghanistan: nothing less than the success of the war in Afghanistan. This war may be a mistake, a blood-soaked blunder, an unholy charnel house mindlessly consuming the bodies and souls of untold thousands, an open sore on the pockmarked face of history and an abomination before the sight of God and men, but it is first and foremost a war, and wars must be won. If the United States doesn't win this war, then will it not lose it? And if the United States loses this war, then won't the Unites States have lost it? And if the United States has lost this war, will that not then make the United States a kind of thing that loses wars? And then where would we be?

And just as America can't afford to abandon this war, surely it can't afford to abandon the Afghan people, who without the American military would be left to the savage whims of their hated enemy, the Afghan people...

The Traffic Circle of Afghanistan

In America, they are called traffic circles. Other geographic locations use the term roundabout. Regardless of where you are, the concept is the same - a whole bunch of twirling, bustling activity that you must somehow thrust yourself into and exit the other side, hopefully unscathed.

So it is with Afghanistan.

Pundits and politicos galore have surfaced scores of ideas about strategies that might deliver the increasingly elusive goal of success. From better governance to protecting the citizenry as a primary mission, to building out infrastructure and ramping up Afghani police and military capability, there's no shortage of suggestions.

But which to choose?

Adam Serwer at TAPPED makes the following observation:

So everyone agreed COIN was the way to go, which isn't much of a "debate," but their emphasis on different aspects of COIN inadvertently shows how difficult it will be for this strategy to work. There are so many difficult objectives that need to be achieved, and the whole COIN strategy falls apart if the U.S. fails to achieve any one of them. With no legitimate government, there's nothing for COIN to strengthen. With no strong civil society, the Afghan government will collapse. If the U.S. can't persuade the Afghan population to see American soldiers as being on their side, there's no way for a U.S. backed government to gain the trust of the Afghan people. Without functioning police and army, there's no one for the U.S. to hand over the job of protecting the Afghans over to. And so on and so forth.

The margin for error grows ever smaller. Is there really an answer?

Image via Wikimedia Commons

America Sports Wood in War on Terror

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has found a novel way to battle Afghan warlords. While wood is involved, surprisingly no one is getting splinters.

I realize that leading clans of ruthless mountain insurgents can be a bit stressful, what with all of those Predator drones shooting laser-guided rockets up your ass and the constant uncertainty that comes from obtaining assistance from Pakistani rebels. Heck, you never know what side the Pakistanis are on anymore.

That said, exactly how is it that giving a handful of tiny blue pills to a tribal leader who has four wives leads to him returning with key intelligence on Taliban activities in exchange for more of the wonder tabs? I mean, if big dicks were instrumental to winning in the Afghani highlands, shouldn't we have been more successful by simply having George W. Bush as our Commander-in-Chief?

Much like the red deer who scamper across the craggy landscape, warlords need some sort of antler-rattling to demonstrate their authority. 

Suppose you're a tribal leader who has been struggling to please the ladies. Who can you turn to in a manly hour of need? What can turn your indigenous three-toed dwarf jerboa into a feisty polecat? It's not me who wants to know - I'm asking for a friend.

There's been a cacophonous outcry lately about how Afghanistan has been largely ignored since the invasion of Iraq, and evidence that our own CIA has resorted to pushing Mr. Blue in order to gain some momentum raises some interesting questions.

Why isn't Enzyte Bob on the front lines? If doling out blueys gets the chieftans some respect, imagine the smiles on their faces when their chuol transforms them into Happy Brakat. Mission accomplished. 

How do I get on their insurance plan?

Have we thought about using the side effects to our advantage? It's well known that sudden decreases in blood pressure can occur as all the blood in your upper body rushes to inflate your johnson, so what better time to stage a raid then went the only weapon in danger of firing is busy doing other things.

Skirmishes lasting more than four hours should be reported to your doktur.

Do not take Viagra if you have trouble walking up steep mountains or firing shoulder-mounted RPGs at coalition troops. Not tested for multiple ambushes.

This makes me wonder if I would have been a better soldier if they had passed this out back when I was wearing combat boots. It certainly would have been easier to keep my pup tent raised.